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EVOLVING CONSUMER SAFEGUARDS-
INCREASED PRODUCER AND SELLER RESPONSIBILITY
IN THE ABSENCE OF STRICT LIABILITY
The author examines the roots of product liability con-
troversy, including several early cases developing the law, and
reviews recent cases suggesting some important modifications in
this field. Emphasis is placed on changes in the duty to warn,
res ipsa loquitur, and contract formation as exemplified in the
cases of Moran v. Faberge, Inc. and Giant Food, Inc. v.
Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
INTRODUCTION
Early Soundings
The scope and extent of liability incurred by the manufacturers,
suppliers, and sellers of consumer goods for injuries caused by the use
of these goods within their intended environment is an issue which saw
its inception not in the awakening of the consumer "movement" of the
last decade,1 but rather during the Industrial Revolution of the 19th
Century. A then freshly revitalized and aroused economy was under-
going an eventual metamorphosis from a rural to an industrial and
technologically based society. Inherent in the evolutionary process was
a necessary evaluation of the relative positions occupied by the new
classes of persons conceived by the infant society: "producers" and
"consumers." The nature and logical concomitant of the constantly
evolving technocracy was a question as to what extent and degree, if
any, those who sought to introduce goods into the stream of commerce
would be accountable for injuries directly and proximately caused
individual consumers by the use of such goods.
The earliest soundings in the field of product liability were by
today's enlightened standards hardly auspicious. Winterbottom v.
Wright,2 an English Court of Exchequer decision in the year 1842, was
the first judicial attempt to affirmatively and formally construe the
relative positions of a manufacturer and a user of a particular product,
and the duties and obligations owed by one to the other. Consistent
misinterpretation of the essential legal foundations of this case,
together with the factual circumstances of the case which contemplated
third party liability,4 caused an inaccurate general proposition for
which the case was cited until well into the twentieth century,5 -the
1. See generally, R. NADER,UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED ; The Designed-In Dangers of the American
Automobile (1965); Nader and Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55
CALiF. L. REV. 645 (1967).
2. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).




"fetish of 'privity of contract'.",6 Perhaps out of fear of "opening the
floodgates," and perhaps out of fear of retarding the rapid industrial
growth of the nation, the court held that, in light of an absence of
privity between the plaintiff, a third party hired to drive a coach and
the defendant, the manufacturer-supplier of the coach, no action could
be maintained on the contract itself.7 On the basis of some
powerful language in the court's opinion,8 however, the case was for
decades misconstrued as standing for the proposition that a failure to
establish privity of contract would similarly bar an action in tort. 9
The harshness of the privity argument was substantiated by
subsequent judicial decisions l° and remained in fact a "fishbone in the
throat of the law"" until effectively vitiated in 1916 by MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co. 12 In MacPherson, the distinction was drawn between
an action on the contract and one inherently lying in negligence, the
latter being deemed the proper perspective by which to view the
product liability question. 13  Judge Cardozo enunciated what has
become a famous legal principle in relation to the duties which inure to
one who seeks to introduce his product into the stream of commerce
for general consumption:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to
place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a
thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of the consequences to
be expected. If to the element of danger there is added
knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other than the
purchaser,.., then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer
of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully....
6. Id. at 623.
7. 152 Eng. Rep. at 405.
8. Id. at 404, 405. The opinion of Lord Abinger states in part:
We ought not to permit a doubt to rest upon this subject, for our doing so might be
the means of letting in upon us an infinity of actions ... There is no privity of
contract between these parties ... unless we confine the operation of such
contracts as this to the parties who entered into them, the most absurd and
outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue....
The Opinion of Judge Alderson continues:
If we were to hold that the plaintiff could sue in such a case there is no point at
which such actions would stop. The only safe rule is to confine the right to recover
to those who enter into the contract: if we go one step beyond that, there is no
reason why we should not go fifty....
9. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 93, at 622.
10. Earl v. Lubbock, 1 K.B. 253 (1905); Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 F.
865 (8th Cir. 1903).
11. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 96, at 641.
12. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
13. Judge Cardozo stated in derogation of the privity doctrine:
We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the
consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing
else. We have put the source of the obligation where it ought to be.
Id. at 390, 111 N.E. at 1053.
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If he is negligent, where danger is to be foreseen, a liability will
follow. 
14
Legal writers' s and courts 16 recognize that while MacPherson at
first blush purported to create a functionally more expansive class of
"inherently dangerous" consumer products, for which a manufacturer
could be held liable in the absence of privity under an exception to the
privity rule, by including any article which would foreseeably be
dangerous to life and limb if made negligently, the operative effect of
MacPherson was one of more far reaching import. The concerted
opinion from both sources conclusively indicated that as a matter of
legal practicality, the case's significance rested upon the unique and
salient effect the case had upon the privity rule-the effect of making
"the exception swallow up the rule."'17 The logical progression to this
conclusion rests upon the duty incumbent upon any manufacturer to
foresee that any negligent deviation in the construction of a product
placed in the stream of commerce creates an unreasonable risk of harm
to members of the general public. This expanded duty allows a
circumvention of the privity rule, thereby "swallowing up" the rule.
Liability is thus coextensive with foreseeability. MacPherson remains
universal law. 1
8
Evolution of Strict Liability
The imperative and exigent bridge between the verification of
negligence as a basic cause of action in product liability litigation and
the adoption by some courts2" of the principle of strict liability in
cases of defective product construction proximately causing consumer
injury, was the inauguration of the criterion of liability for warranties
given the consumer concerning his product. 20 Baxter v. Ford Motor
Co., 2 1 the first judicial recognition of this doctrine, involved express
representations in the form of generally distributed advertising material
by an automobile manufacturer that all windshields on its product were
wholly "shatterproof." Thereafter, the plaintiff, a purchaser of the
automobile, was severely injured when a stone struck and shattered the
windshield. The Supreme Court of Washington held that statements in
the above-mentioned literature as to the nature and shatterproof
quality of the glass constituted an express representation made to the
14. Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
15. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 96 at 642-43; Peairs, The God in the Machine, 29 BOSTON U. L.
REV. 37 (1949).
16. Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946).
17. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 96 at 643.
18. Id.
19. Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General
Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919 (Mun. App. D.C. 1962).
20. 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 733 (1958); 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1092 (1958); 18 SYR. L. REV. 127
(1966).
21. 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932), aff'd on rehearing 15 P.2d 1118 (1932).
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plaintiff, an express warranty upon which plaintiff was entitled to
rely.2 2 However, the decision is further significant in its expansion of
what MacPherson only forebode; that is, the manufacturer may incur
liability when a warranty is given even without an affirmative showing
by plaintiff that the manufacturer was aware that its representations
were erroneous, or an affirmative showing that the manufacturer was
negligent.2 3 This liability has been called "the simplest form of strict
liability, 2 4 and again provided a genuine point of further departure
from which successive arguments in favor of the strict liability standard
were developed.
Strict liability in tort for defective products succeeded this juncture
in the law almost as a matter of course. It was universally recognized
that substantial unresolved problems existed in the warranty solution as
a basis for the imposition of liability upon the manufacturer,
specifically in the clouded distinction between the supply of goods and
the supply of services,25 and in the continuing privity dispute. 26
Therefore, strict liability in tort, which had previously been applied to
the sale of tainted food products,27 was extended by the American
Law Institute to encompass any and all defectively constructed
products via the now famous Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.2" Subsection (2)(b) of Section 402A dispensed with
the requirement of privity of contract between the manufacturer and
the consumer as a necessary part of a product liability suit, and further,
Subsection (2)(a) declared formally that no showing of due care by the
22. Id. at 462-63, 12 P.2d at 412.
23. Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 179 Wash. 123, 127-28, 35 P.2d 1090, 1092 (1934).
24. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 97 at 651.
25. Ageis Prods., Inc. v. Arriflex Corp. of America, 25 App. Div. 2d 639, 268 N.Y.S.2d 185
(1966): "Warranties are limited to sales of goods. No warranty attaches to the
performance of a service." But cf., Albin v. Illinois Crop Improvements Ass'n, Inc., 30
Ill. App. 2d 283, 174 N.E.2d 697 (1961).
26. "[Nbo one doubts that, unless there is privity, liability to the consumer must be in tort
and not in contract ... the change is called for." W. Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel, 69 YALE L. J. 1099, 1134 (1960).
27. Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913).
28. The complete text of 402A provides:
Topic 5. Strict Liability
Sec. 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
1975]
manufacturer in the "preparation of sale" of his product, no matter
how great in degree, could vitiate the manufacturer's liability for
physical harm caused to the ultimate user or consumer of the product
where the product was defectively constructed.
Section 402A was first sustained and applied in 1963 in Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc. ,29 a case involving a defectively constructed
combination power tool being properly operated as a wood lathe, and
in short order was adopted by several other states30 anxious to
circumvent any further problems which the warranty doctrine might
engender. Strict liability for defective product construction is now a
generally accepted principle in the substantial majority of states.
At the present writing, Maryland has elected to remain in the
dwindling minority of jurisdictions that have not yet adopted the strict
liability standard, 3 1  although acceptance of the doctrine may be
imminent. Consumerism, however, is by no means dormant. A
significant aggregate of recent decisions have indicated the willingness
of the Maryland judiciary to implement certain emphatic consumer
safeguards beyond and in lieu of the express acceptance of strict
liability as a remedial basis. It shall therefore be the further purpose of
this article to examine and evaluate certain of these enlightened
safeguards, and place them in proper perspective with the absence of
strict liability in Maryland.
BEYOND STRICT LIABILITY
The Duty to Warn
It is now a universally recognized tenet of the law of product liability
that the manufacturer of a product that is likely to be unreasonably
dangerous when employed within the parameters of a foreseeable use of
the product has a duty to warn the ultimate consumer or user of the
product of its latent dangers. 32 This warning contemplates not only a
29. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
30. Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189 (1965); Suvada v. White Motor Co.,
32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Dealers Transportation Co. v. Battery Distrib.
Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1965); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154
N.W.2d 488 (1967); Olney v. Beaman Bottling Co., 220 Tenn. 459,418 S.W.2d 430
(1967).
31. Telak v. Maszcenski, 248 Md. 476, 237 A.2d 434 (1968):
Whatever we may be persuaded to do in the future in this regard, we find it
unnecessary, at this time, to espouse the cause of strict liability. Id. at 488, 237
A.2d at 440-41;
Bona v. Graefe, 264 Md. 69, 285 A.2d 607 (1972):
[Wle have, on two occasions in the past declined to espouse the doctrine .... Id.
at 77, 285 A.2d at 611;
Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974):
With respect to the contention that the complaint sets forth a cause of action
under the "strict liability" theory of Restatement 2d, Torts, § 402A, this Court
has not endorsed the theory of that section. Id. at 220, 321 A.2d at 747.
32. Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975); Katz v. Arundel-Brooks
Concrete Corp., 220 Md. 200, 151 A.2d 731 (1959); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF IbRTS
§ 388 (1965).
132 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 5
Consumer Safeguards
delineation of foreseeable dangers encompassed within the intended use
of the product, but where applicable, appropriate and reasonable,
directions and instructions for the safe and proper use of the
product.3 3 Warnings and directions are not of necessity identical.
Whereas the warning merely indicates a foreseeable hazard, directions
and instructions specify procedures for the proper and efficient use of
the product and for avoiding danger. "A manufacturer might provide
one and still be liable in failing to provide the other, as where
instructions fail to alert the user to the danger they seek to avert, or
where a warning alerts the user to a peril but does not enable him to
avoid it."' 34 It is therefore said that where the use of an article is safer
if the user follows a specific procedure inculcating certain precise
precautionary measures not a matter of common knowledge, the
manufacturer may have a duty of care to take reasonable steps to warn
and direct potential users of the product.35
It should be preliminarily noted at this juncture that the central
concern herein, that of a product containing an inadequate warning of
latent dangers, is separate and distinct from any consideration of an
item defectively constructed. In short, the two operate on different
planes and theories of relative liability. Both the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, 36  and a decided bulk of interpretative case law 37 hold
conclusively that "one who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property" is
strictly liable to the consumer or user for any injury sustained thereby,
with no burden on the aggrieved consumer to show either a duty
incumbent upon the defendant or a breach thereof by the defendant,
the traditional bases of the negligence action.
38
Conversely, the strict liability foundation for recovery is not available
in cases involving a product incorporating a faulty warning, but
otherwise containing no unreasonably dangerous constructional defects.
The courts, whether imposing liability upon the manufacturer for
a dangerously deficient warning or not, have unanimously and
conclusively indicated that the viable criteria for determining liability in
actions where the injured consumer is alleging such deficient warning as
33. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Baridon, 73 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1934); J.C. Lewis Motor
Co. v. Williams, 85 Ga. App. 538, 69 S.E.2d 816 (1952); McClanahan v. California
Spray-Chemical Corp., 194 Va. 842, 75 S.E.2d 712 (1953); McCully v: Fuller Brush Co.,
68 Wash. 2d 675,415 P.2d 7 (1966).
34. 2 F. HARPER & F.'JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS,§ 28.7 at 1547, n.2 (4th ed. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES ].
35. Id. § 28.7 at 1547.
36. See note 28 supra.
37. See note 30 supra.
38. See Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919 (Mun. App. D.C. 1962):
[Riecovery is based upon [only] two factors: (a)The product or article in
question has been transferred from the manufacturer's possession while in a
"defective" state ... (b) as a result of being "defective," the product causes
personal injury or property damage. Id. at 922.
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a ground for recovery are general negligence principles, not absolute
liability.39 It is therefore apparent that a successful plaintiff in a
product liability action founded upon an allegedly inadequate warning
would necessarily be required to plead and prove that the defendant's
breach of his duty of reasonable care proximately caused injuries.
The Maryland judiciary has sustained the rule of product liability law
that the negligent failure to warn of concealed and latent dangers is a
breach of duty sufficient to impose liability upon the negligent
manufacturer for consumer injury.40 It has been held that this duty to
warn "is no different from the responsibility each of us bears to
exercise due care to avoid unreasonable risks of harm to others." 
4 1
Implicit within the unreasonable risk issue are questions concerning the
essential adequacy of the warning itself, if indeed a warning is given,
and these questions are factual, requiring an evaluation in consideration
of the underlying and surrounding circumstances of the individual
case.4 2  The warning itself should be of a nature and design that is
reasonably calculated and intended to reach and be understood by
individuals likely to use the product.4 3 The warning must itself be
intelligible to and readily understandable by the average consumer of
the particular product4 and it must be basically distinct 45  to be
adjudged adequate. A generally suggested position pertinent to deter-
mining the comparative adequacy for a particular warning is the holding
by some courts4 6 that the warning, to be adequate per se, must be
given to the general buying public at large: those to whom the
manufacturer, by widespread representations and advertising, prompts
to implement his product.4 7 It is therefore apparent that a warning to
the original purchaser alone will be insufficient.48
The Maryland law concerning a manufacturer's duty to warn accords
with the traditional negligence concepts of tort law. In the most recent
39. See note 30 supra. See also PROSSER, supra note 3, § 96 at 644.
40. Twombley v. Fuller Brush Co., 221 Md. 476, 158 A.2d 110 (1960); Moran v. Faberge,
Inc., 273 Md. 538, 544, 332 A.2d 11, 15 (1975), in which Judge Digges cited the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965) with approval.
41. Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975) citing HARPER & JAMES
§ 28.3 and PROSSER,supra note 3, § 31. Judge Digges indicated:
Whether any such unreasonable risk exists in a given situation depends on
balancing the probability and seriousness of harm, if care is not exercised, against
the costs of taking appropriate precautions. Id. at 543, 332 A.2d at 15.
42. HARPER & JAMES, § 28.7 at 1548.
43. Id.
44. Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1958).
45. McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 11 N.Y.2d 62, 226, N.Y.S.2d 407, 181
N.E.2d 430 (1962).
46. See E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Baridon, 73 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1934); Altorfer
Bros. Co. v. Green, 236 Ala. 427, 183 So. 415 (1938).
47. Dillard & Hart, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L.
REv. 145 (1955).
48. H ARPER & JAMES § 28.7 at 1548. This conclusion is also based in part upon
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFTORTS, § 388, Comment h. Cf. Annot., 164 A.L.R. 470
(1946).
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case on point, Moran v. Faberge, Inc.,49 the analysis of the Court of
Appeals of Maryland cut a broad swath across the plane of general
common law concepts, specifically that of foreseeability. Moran
involved a product liability action against a manufacturer of cologne for
injuries suffered by the plaintiff, a seventeen-year-old girl. In-Moran,
the plaintiff's friend poured perfume ° from a drip bottle onto the
lower portion of a candle's wick, somewhat below the flame. The
candle burst into flame, burning the plaintiff on her neck and breasts.
At the trial the plaintiff introduced evidence indicative of the high
flammability and combustibility of the perfume compound, and
testimony from two Faberge officials, the company's chief perfumer
and a company aerosol chemist to the effect that Faberge was not only
fully cognizant of the potential flammability of the perfume, but also
was aware of its latent dangerous propensities when brought into close
contact with a flame.
Faberge centered its defense upon what has become a popular and,
on occasion, successful motif for manufacturer absolution in many late
product liability decisions-the doctrine of 'intended use.' 5 ' The nexus
between the seemingly diverse considerations of the foreseeability of
imminent danger to the consumer, concededly possessed by Faberge,
and considerations relative to the question of intended use may be
expressed as follows: if it can be said that the intended use of a
particular product encompasses any foreseeable use to which the
product may be put, then the manufacturer of the product has created
an unreasonable risk (and is therefore negligent and subject to
corresponding liability) by failing to give the consumer an adequate
warning of the existence of such latent hazards;5 2 however, if it can be
said that the manufacturer's responsibility to warn extends only to
those intended uses for which the product was supplied, then any latent
danger concerning a use that, although wholly foreseeable, was not one
for which the product was supplied, confers upon the manufacturer no
duty to warn. The Moran court formally resolved that "the duty of the
manufacturer to warn of latent dangers inherent in its product goes
beyond the precise use contemplated by the producer and extends to
all those which are reasonably foreseeable.",5 3  While there are earlier
cases5 4  to the same effect, it must in fairness be indicated that the
49. 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975).
50. Faberge's Tigress cologne was the perfume used.
51. See, Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
836; but see Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Badorek v.
General Motors Corp., 11 Cal. App. 3d 902, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1970); Volkswagen of
America Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1975); Mickle v. Blackmon, 252
S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969).
52. Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 544-45, 332 A.2d 11, 15 (1975). Cf. Twombley v.
Fuller Brush Co., 221 Md. 476, 158 A.2d 110 (1960); Katz v. Arundel-Brooks Concrete
Corp., 220 Md. 200, 151 A.2d 731 (1959).
53. Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. at 544-46, 332 A.2d at 15-16.
54. Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 83-84 (4th Cir. 1962); Hall v. E.I. DuPont
De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 363 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
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proposition is equally well-founded that where the use made of a
product is so remote from that intended as to render such use
unforeseeable, the manufacturer of the product incurs no liability for
failure to warn of latent dangers inherent in such use."
Moran ultimately held as a matter of law that the issue of Faberge's
negligence was a factual question for sole determination by the jury and
reversed, remanding the case to the Court of Special Appeals. 6 This
conclusion was reached after an exceedingly thorough evaluation by the
court5 7  of prior decisions based on factual analysis of whether the
latent dangers inherent in the products in question would reasonably
follow from their foreseeable use. Several are worthy of mention.
A supplier of shoes is not liable in failing to warn a woman that if she
knowingly wears shoes which are two sizes too small she creates a risk
of injury,5 8 nor is a producer responsible for failure to warn that "a
knife... will... cut or a hammer... will... mash a thumb or a
stove ... will ... burn a finger." 5 9 Citing Harper and James' treatise on
Torts,6 ° the Moran court indicated the following instances where there
are latent dangers that might foreseeably accompany the use of the
particular product:
Hair dye will be applied to hair and will touch the skin;
cosmetics will be applied to faces; underclothes will be worn
next to the skin; tractors will get mired; food will be eaten; and
so on.
6 1
Other cases cited by Moran affirm that it is foreseeable that a baby
might consume furniture polish; 62 that a painter might inadvertently
splash paint in his eye;6 3 and that use of an automobile encompasses its
involvement in vehicular collisions. 64 Conversely, it has been held as a
OF TORTS, § 395, comment K:
Foreseeable uses and risks. The manufacturer may, however, reasonably anticipate
other uses than the one for which the chattel is primarily intended. The maker of
a chair, for example, may reasonably expect that someone will stand on it; and
the maker of an inflammable cocktail robe may expect that it will be worn in the
kitchen in close proximity to a fire. Likewise the manufacturer may know, or may
be under a duty to discover, that some possible users of the product are especially
susceptible to harm from it ... and he fails to take reasonable precautions, by
giving warning or otherwise, against harm to such person.
55. Smith v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 185 F. Supp. 751 (E.D. Pa. 1960), citing HARPER & JAMES,
§ 28.6 and PROSSER, supra note 3, at 503 (2d ed. 1955).
56. 273 Md. at 555, 332 A.2d at 21.
57. Id. at 545-50, 332 A.2d at 16-18.
58. Dubbs v. Zak Bros. Co., 38 Ohio App. 299, 175 N.E. 626 (1931).
59. Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
855 (1957).
60. HARPER & J AMES, § 28.6.
61. 273 Md. at 546-47, 332 A.2d at 16-17.
62. Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962).
63. Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1958).
64. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Volkswagen of America,
Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974).
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matter of law that a manufacturer could not reasonably foresee that a
housewife in the course of housework could spatter cleaning fluid in
her eye;65 nor could an automobile manufacturer, as a matter of law,
foresee that an automobile's intended use included its involvement in
collisions.6 6 This is confusing in light of Volkswagen of America, Inc.
v. Young. The facts of the cases are analogous yet the results are
opposite.
A further maxim of the Moran decision is the utility the court makes
of the language in Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co. 6 7 bearing upon the
foreseeable "zone of danger." Palsgraf dictated that so long as the
distinct possibility of an accident to the plaintiff was readily foresee-
able to the defendant, even though the precise and particular set of
circumstances which contrived the accident was not at all apparent, the
defendant would nevertheless be liable to the plaintiff.68 The Palsgraf
doctrine retained its resiliency throughout several decades, and had
been implicitly adopted in Maryland in Segerman v. Jones69 where the
court stated: "[T]he question is whether the actual harm fell within a
general field of danger which should have been anticipated. 7 0
The relative significance of Moran in this regard is two-fold: first, it
affirmed the Maryland adoption of the Palsgraf "general zone of
danger" rationale; and second, it constituted the first Maryland
extension of the doctrine to the product liability situation where an
absence of sufficient warning is alleged. The court cited Harper7" with
approval:
[T]here is no liability for damage that falls entirely outside the
general threat of harm which made the conduct of the actor
negligent. The sequence of events, of iourse, need not be
foreseeable. The manner in which the risk culminates in harm
may be unusual, improbable and highly unexpectable, from the
point of view of the actor at the time of his conduct. And yet,
if the harm suffered falls within the general danger area, there
65. Sawyer v. Pine Oil Sales Co., 155 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1946).
66. Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836
(1966).
67. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). Judge Cardozo stated:
The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk
imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of
apprehension .... This does not mean, of course, that one who launches a
destructive force is always relieved of liability, if the force, though known to be
destructive, pursues an unexpected path. It was not necessary that the defendant
should have had notice of the particular method in which an accident would
occur, if the possibility of an accident was clear to the ordinarily prudent eye. Id.
at 344, 162 N.E. at 100.
68. Id.
69. 256 Md. 109, 259 A.2d 794 (1969).
70. Id. at 132, 259 A.2d at 805 quoting from McLeod v. Grant County School Dist., 42
Wash. 2d 316, 255 P.2d 368 (1953).
71. F. HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 7 (1933).
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may be liability, provided other requisites of legal causation are
present. 
72
Here again liability is co-extensive with foreseeability. Summarily, then,
the court, applying the above doctrine to the facts and circumstances of
the case at bar, concluded that it was not necessary to the imposition of
liability that the defendant Faberge had foreseen that the cologne
would be poured on the candle. The manufacturer must foresee instead
that the perfume, within the environment of its use, might come near
enough to some type of flame to explode and directly and proximately
cause injury to an individual, such as Nancy Moran, in the immediate
area.
7 3
While certain courts have objected to the central assumption that
liability should be co-extensive with foreseeability; some even holding
that an attempt to confer liability for negligence on the "gossamer" of
foreseeability was undeviating fantasy,74 the principle nonetheless
retains its viability. The apparent diametric opposition in the result of
several cases 75  containing analogous facts and circumstances stems
from disagreement concerning the factual presence or absence of
foreseeability of harm. The concept of foreseeability must, therefore
ultimately be construed as the genuine line of demarcation for the
battle between the manufacturer and the consumer over the duty to
warn of latent hazards.
Giant Steps
RES IPSA LOQUITUR Revitalized
Further novel, vital and dramatic modulations in the Maryland law of
product liability have resulted from the case of Giant Food, Inc. v.
Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc.76 Giant is like Moran in that it
effectively interpreted, extended, and interpolated within modem law
certain common law principles of consumer protection. The Giant
court, however, evinced a predeliction toward avoidance of the
foreseeability question 77 instead electing to construe the issues raised
in light of the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and Uniform Commercial
Code contract interpretation.
In Giant, the customer had taken a six-pack carton of Coca-Cola
from a display bin at one of the defendant's supermarkets and had
placed it in his shopping cart for the purpose of purchasing it. En route
to the checkout counter, one of the bottles exploded, dripping liquid
72. 273 Md. at 551-52, 332 A.2d at 19.
73. Id. at 553-54, 332 A.2d at 20.
74. Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 20 Md. App. 518, 530-31, 317 A.2d 494, 501 (1974),
cert. granted July 5, 1974 to Md. Court of Appeals.
75. See notes 63-67 supra.
76. 273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d 1 (1975).
77. It should in all fairness be noted that there is a substantial and viable argument that the
facts of Giant did not lend themselves to a "foreseeability"-type evaluation.
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onto the floor, which caused the customer to slip and fall, sustaining
severe personal injuries. He thereafter initiated an action based upon
two grounds-res ipsa loquitur as the basis for allegations of negligence,
and breach of implied warranty, against the retailer, Giant Food,
Inc., and against the bottler, Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc.
The cause of action was upheld against the retailer on both theories,
but held ineffective, on both theories, to impose liability upon the
manufacturer, Coca-Cola. Both Siegel and Giant were granted certiorari
by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, which affirmed the decision
rendered by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals relative to the
liability of defendant Giant and the non-liability of defendant
Coca-Cola under res ipsa and warranty theories.
The salient feature of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur rests in its
apparent exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved,
and shall never be presumed.7 9 It is said that the fact that an accident
or injury has occurred, with nothing further indicated, is insufficient
evidence of negligence. However, when there is evidence from which
reasonable persons might infer that, upon the whole, it is more likely
than not that the injury was caused by negligence, so long as certain
further criteria which subsequently shall be discussed are present, a
presumption of negligence is permitted to arise. 8 0 The operation of the
doctrine has been illustrated best by the two "banana peel" cases. 81
While the single fact of the existence of a banana peel on a floor is
alone insufficient to indicate that it has been there long enough for the
78. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-314 (1969). The statute reads in full:
§ 2-314. Implied warranty; merchantability; usage of trade.
(1) Unless excluded or modified (§ 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall
be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant
with respect to goods of that kind. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this
subtitle, in §§ 2-3i4 through 2-318 of this subtitle, "seller" shall include the
manufacturer, distributor, dealer, wholesaler or other middleman, and/or the
retailer; and any previous requirement of privity is abolished as between the buyer
and any of the aforementioned parties in any action brought by the buyer. Under
this section the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the
premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) Pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) In the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the
description; and
(c) Are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) Run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) Are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may
require; and
(f) Conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container
or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (§ 2-316) other implied warranties may
arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
79. PaOSSEa, supra note 3, § 39 at 211.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 212-13.
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defendant in the exercise of reasonable care to remove it,8 2 if it is
"black, flattened out and gritty, 8 3 the inference in reasonable minds
is that it is more likely than not that the banana was on the floor for an
extended length of time and the doctrine may consequently be
invoked.
The doctrine saw a slow acceptance in Maryland in the product
liability situation. Early cases summarily rejected application of the
doctrine on a multiplicity of theories. It was held that the doctrine
would not apply if the plaintiff pleaded specific acts of negligence,8 4 if
the evidence was capable of two inferences,8 5 or if the plaintiff failed to
show that the thing which caused the injury was in the exclusive
control of the defendant.8 6 The harshness of a literal interpretation of
these rules has been alleviated significantly. In 1963, it was held that
only three elements were necessary for the invocation of the doctrine:
1. A casualty of a sort which usually does not occur in the
absence of negligence.
2. Caused by an instrumentality within the defendant's ex-
clusive control.
3. Under circumstances indicating that the casualty did not
result from the act or omission of the plaintiff. 
7
Subsequent cases88 recognized, as did the Giant court,8 9 that the basic
problem with the above formula rested in the second criterion, the
requirement that the plaintiff must conclusively establish the exclusive
control of the instrumentality by the allegedly negligent defendant. The
essence of Giant, however, lies in its mitigation of the absolute rule.
Citing the Leikach v. Royal Crown Bottling Co. of Baltimore 90
decision, the court indicated:
[Plaintiff] is not required to exclude every possible cause for
her injuries other than that of negligence; she is only required to
show a greater likelihood that her injury was caused by the
defendant's negligence than by some other cause .... 91
The operative effect of this holding is profound; plaintiff's burden no
longer is to show absolutely exclusive control of the injurious
82. Goddard v. Boston & Maine R.R. Co., 179 Mass. 52, 60 N.E. 486 (1901).
83. Anjou v. Boston Elev. R.R. Co., 208 Mass. 273, 94 N.E. 386 (1911).
84. Joffre v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 222 Md. 1, 158 A.2d 631 (1960).
85. Preston v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 749 (D.C. 1958).
86. Lee v. Housing Authority of Baltimore City, 203 Md. 453, 101 A.2d 832 (1954).
87. Compare Munzert v. American Stores, 232 Md. 97, 192 A.2d 59 (1963) with Liekach v.
Royal Crown Bottling Co. of Balto., 261 Md. 541, 547-48, 276 A.2d 81, 84 (1971).
88. Liekach v. Royal Crown Bottling Co. of Balto., 261 Md. 541, 276 A.2d 81 (1971);
Zarling v. LaSalle Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 2 Wisc. 2d 596, 87 N.W.2d 263 (1958).
89. 273 Md. at 597-98, 332 A.2d at 4.
90. Leikach v. Royal Crown Bottling Co. of Balto., 261 Md. 541, 276 A.2d 81 (1971).
91. 273 Md. at 598, 332 A.2d at 5.
instrumentality, but is merely to indicate to some definitive degree that
the injury was more likely than not occasioned by the negligence of the
particular defendant upon whom liability is sought to be imposed.
Indeed, this interpretation is most enlightened and laudatory in
consideration of the nature of our modem day stream of commerce
where an article can seldom be deemed to have been within the
"exclusive" control of a specific individual. Successive transfers from
manufacturer, to distributor, to wholesaler, to retailer encompass a
multiplicity of control, which would preclude in toto any recourse to
the res ipsa doctrine if the exclusivity principle were to be literally
taken. Hence, evidence presented in Giant to the effect that the
explosion of the bottle could neither have been caused by thermal
shock nor any other defect in manufacture was held, pursuant to the
rule as mitigated, sufficient to show a greater likelihood that plaintiff's
injury was caused by the retailer's (Giant's) negligence than some other
cause, therefore entitling the plaintiff to apply res ipsa loquitur to infer
the negligence of the retailer.
92
It should be noted parenthetically that the Giant decision still
operates to shift the burden of proof to but one defendant, and not
multiple defendants. While two states9 3 have taken the doctrine one
step further and have directed application of res ipsa once prima facie
negligence is indicated, thereby shifting the burden of proof to multiple
defendants, the Maryland courts are loathe to tread that path absent a
showing of joint negligence. 94 It is therefore a further legal tenet of
Giant that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable against
more than a solitary defendant unless it is shown that multiple
defendants' liability was joint, or that such defendants were in joint or
exclusive control of the injury-producing factor; or that the true
tortfeasor among the various defendants is not identified. 95 Beyond
this limitation, however, the extended and simplified applicability of
the res ipsa doctrine within the parameters of the product liability
action in Maryland is a tree bearing positive fruit for the consumer.
Warranty and Contract Formation Revitalized
A further transition in Maryland law engendered by the Giant
decision was the enlightened recognition by the court of the positive,
92. Id. at 598-99, 332 A.2d at 5-6.
93. Loch v. Confair, 372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953); Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258
P.2d 317 (1953). The court in Giant notes: "The essence of this concept is that the
evidence of the cause of injury is not equally available to both sides, but is
exclusively.., within the possession of the defendants." Id. at 600, 332 A.2d at 6.
Citing Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 847 (1966), the court
stated: 'The reasoning in these cases as to the meaning of 'exclusive control' is not very
convincing; and they are quite evidently deliberate decisions of policy, seeking to
compensate the plaintiff and to require the defendants to fight out the question of
responsibility among themselves."Id. at 600, 332 A.2d at 6.
94. 273 Md. at 601, 332 A.2d at 7.
95. Id.
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flexible approach to contract formation espoused by the Uniform
Commercial Code. The existence of a contractual relationship between
plaintiff and defendant is required for the existence of a warranty of
merchantability under Section 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.96 The retailer's primary defense in Giant rested upon the
asserted non-existence of any warranty because of the asserted
non-existence of any contract. In support of this contention, the
defendant retailer argued that the plaintiff's failure to pay for the
coca-cola by the time the bottles exploded created a unilateral contract
which could be accepted only by performance, as opposed to an
executory bilateral contract which would exist when the bottles were
removed from the shopping cart even though no payment had been
effected.9 7
The defendant's argument would have seen greater success under the
Uniform Sales Act,98 abrogated by Maryland in 1963 in favor of the
Uniform Commercial Code. 9 9 The fallacy of theory upon which
contract formation under the Sales Act rested was in the absolutes
which it decreed: the "lump-concept"' 0 0 approach. This approach
dictated that the court should:
[D]ecide under the specific facts of a case that the "title" was
in the seller or the buyer, a wide-premise decision; which then
dictated the answer to many unrelated problems such as risk of
loss, liability for price... standing... and the like. A decision
on title in one case was authority for a decision on title in
another, even though the particular issues to be decided in the
two cases were radically different. 10
Thus, the relevant inquiry under the Uniform Sales Act was the
location of the title to the goods in question.
In sharp contrast, the Uniform Commercial Code adopted a more
"flexible contractual approach instead of following the more rigid
concept of title to which the Sales Act adhered.' ' 0 2 Section 2-401 of
the Code speaks directly to the issue, formally and efficiently
derogating the applicability of the "title" argument:
96. See note 79 supra. Official Comment 13 to the above-cited statute provides in part:
In an action based on breach of warranty, it is of course necessary to show not
only the existence of the warranty but the fact that the warranty was broken and
that the breach of the warranty was the proximate cause of the loss sustained.
97. 273 Md. at 602-03, 332 A.2d at 7.
98. Law of Feb. 1, ch. 538, § 1 [1964] Laws of Maryland 749.
99. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., §§ 1-101 to 10-104 (1975). The UCC has been in effect
in Maryland since February 1, 1964.
100. W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,'§ 1.2401 at
143 (1964).
101. Id.
102. Wilke, Inc. v. Commins Diesel, Inc., 252 Md. 611, 250 A.2d 886 (1969), cited in Giant,
273 Md. at 604, 332 A.2d at 8.
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Each provision of this subtitle with regard to the rights,
obligations and remedies of the seller, the buyer, purchasers or
other third parties applies irrespective of title to the goods.
The Giant court, citing Official Comment 1 to Section 2-401, rein-
forced the apparent Code rejection of the Uniform Sales Act "title"
doctrine by adopting the following language:
1. This subtitle deals with the issues between seller and buyer
in terms of step by step performance or non-performance under
the contract for sale and not in terms of whether or not "title"
to the goods has passed.
10 3
Therefore, the predominant significance of the Giant decision rests
upon its interpretation of when a contract is created in the self-service
retail situation, the court holding ultimately, in accord with the
"flexible contract approach" of the UCC,' 4 that the retailer de-
fendant's act of placing the bottles in question upon the shelf with the
price stamped thereon manifested an intent to offer them for sale, and
the plaintiff's act of taking physical possession of the goods with the
intent to purchase manifested an intent to accept the offer, creating a
valid contract for the sale of the goods. Therefore, with a contract
extant, a retailer's warranty of merchantability arises not only when
goods are paid for at the check-out counter, but also when the
customer, with intent to purchase, places or attempts to place them in
his shopping cart en route to the check-out counter for the purpose of
effecting a purchase.' 0 5 A synthesis of similar reasoning in other
jurisdictions1 6 has resulted in the holding akin to Giant that in the
context of a self-service supermarket, a contract for sale may arise
before goods are actually bought. Implicit within the Giant court's
opinion is the recognition that the retailer who seeks to avail himself of
the expediency and great profit of the self-service sales systems' 0 7 must
103. 273 Md. at 604, 332 A.2d at 8.
104. The court emphasized the flexibility of the UCC approach to contract formation by
quoting several sections with approval. Some sections cited together with relevant text
therefrom, are as follows:
§ 2-204. Formation in general. (1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in
any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties
which recognizes the existence of such a contract.
Further, and most significantly:
§ 2-206. Offer and acceptance in formation of contract. (1) Unless otherwise
unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstance
(a) An offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in
any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstance.
105. 273 Md. at 605, 332 A.2d at 8.
106. Gillispie v. Great Atlantic and Pactific Tea Co., 14 N.C. App. 1, 187 S.E.2d 441 (1972);
Sanchez-Lopez v. Fedco Food Corp., 27 Misc. 2d 131, 311 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1961).
107. The court noted:
[T]he customer who is welcomed into the retailer's store is faced with no choice.
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correspondingly accept court determination of increased breadth and
depth of contract formation, and consequent relations, duties and
obligations of warranty which they impose. As with the res ipsa
loquitur issue treated above, the basic common law principles of offer
and acceptance again effect a positive and vital change for consumer
reform when extended and expanded in the modem-day product
liability situation.
CONCLUSION
What should be conclusively realized from an analysis of the
respective decisions of Moran v. Faberge, Inc., and Giant Food, Inc. v.
Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc., is that Maryland has directly
effectuated significant master-strokes for the contemporary consumer
crusade not through adoption of a modern standard of strict liability,
but rather through the adoption and extension of common law
principles to current product controversies. While these measures do
provide effective consumer safeguards, it must be realized that they are
a product of the refusal of the Maryland courts to adopt the strict
liability standard, for no common law standard can supplant the
doctrine's effectiveness as a salutary consumer tool. Notwithstanding
adverse criticism, 0 8 the doctrine provides a manifestly more just and
less arbitrary criterion for determination of liability. The burden on the
manufacturer is not unfairly excessive. The manufacturer is under no
duty to make an accident-proof or fool-proof product, 10 9 nor is it
automatically held liable as an insurer against consumer in-
jury o-the law is clear on this point. It imposes upon the manufac-
turer a responsibility to take reasonable steps to market a product that
will not deleteriously affect those members of the general public who
use it. A manufacturer who markets a defectively constructed item
should be forestalled from escaping liability at the expense of the
consumer injured as a consequence of defective and dangerous
construction.
Although the Maryland judiciary has not adopted the strict liability
standard, its recent opinions express a laudable concern that he who
seeks to introduce goods into the stream of commerce must stand ready
If he chooses to shop in that store, he must do so under the terms imposed by the
retailer. He must select goods, place them in a cart provided by the retailer, and
then tender payment at the check-out counters located near the exit. Thus, the
only reasonable manner in which a customer of a self-service establishment can
accept the store's offer is by taking the goods into his possession. 273 Md. at 607,
332 A.2d at 9.
108. See note 32 supra.
109. Gosselt v. Chrysler Corp., 359 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1966); Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y.
468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
110. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Evans v. General Motors
Corp., 359 F.2d 495 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966); Volkswagen of
America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974).
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to assume responsibility and concurrent liability for any injuries
resulting from their use which were or should have been foreseeable.
Apparently, the courts have decided that the ever-increasing technologi-
cal expertise possessed by today's manufacturer gives rise to an
ever-increasing responsibility to the public.
Steven I. Greenwald
